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3Abstract
Information-theoretic security – widely accepted as the strictest notion of security – relies on channel
coding techniques that exploit the inherent randomness of the propagation channels to significantly
strengthen the security of digital communications systems. Motivated by recent developments in the field,
this paper aims at a characterization of the fundamental secrecy limits of wireless networks. Based on a
general model in which legitimate nodes and potential eavesdroppers are randomly scattered in space, the
intrinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph) is defined from the point of view of information-
theoretic security. Conclusive results are provided for the local connectivity of the Poisson iS-graph,
in terms of node degrees and isolation probabilities. It is shown how the secure connectivity of the
network varies with the wireless propagation effects, the secrecy rate threshold of each link, and the noise
powers of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. Sectorized transmission and eavesdropper neutralization
are explored as viable strategies for improving the secure connectivity. Lastly, the maximum secrecy rate
between a node and each of its neighbours is characterized, and the case of colluding eavesdroppers is
studied. The results help clarify how the spatial density of eavesdroppers can compromise the intrinsic
security of wireless networks.
Index Terms
Physical-layer security, wireless networks, stochastic geometry, secure connectivity, node degree,
secrecy capacity, colluding eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary security systems for wireless networks are based on cryptographic primitives
that generally ignore two key factors: (a) the physical properties of the wireless medium, and
(b) the spatial configuration of both the legitimate and malicious nodes. These two factors
are important since they affect the communication channels between the nodes, which in turn
determine the fundamental secrecy limits of a wireless network. In fact, the inherent randomness
of the physics of the wireless medium and the spatial location of the nodes can be leveraged to
provide intrinsic security of the communications infrastructure at the physical-layer level.1
1In the literature, the term “security” typically encompasses 3 different characteristics: secrecy (or privacy), integrity, and
authenticity. This paper does not consider the issues of integrity or authenticity, and the terms “secrecy and “security” are used
4The basis for information-theoretic security, which builds on the notion of perfect secrecy [1],
was laid in [2] and later in [3]. Moreover, almost at the same time, the basic principles of public-
key cryptography, which lead to the predominance of computational security, were published in
[4]. More recently, there has been a renewed interest in information-theoretic security over wire-
less channels. Space-time signal processing techniques for secure communication over wireless
links are introduced in [5]. The secrecy of cooperative relay broadcast channels is considered
in [6]. The case of a fixed number of colluding eavesdroppers placed at the same location is
analyzed in [7]. The scenario of compound wiretap channels is considered in [8]. The capacity of
cognitive interference channels with secrecy constraints is analyzed in [9]. The achievable secret
communication rates using multiple-input multiple-output communications are investigated in
[10]–[14]. The secrecy capacity of various degraded fading channels is established in [15]. A
detailed characterization of the outage secrecy capacity of slow fading channels is provided in
[16]. The ergodic secrecy capacity of fading channels was derived independently in [17]–[19].
The notion of strong secrecy for wireless channels is introduced in [20]. Some secrecy properties
of random geometric graphs were presented in [21].
We are interested in the fundamental secrecy limits of large-scale wireless networks. The
spatial location of the nodes can be modeled either deterministically or stochastically. De-
terministic models include square, triangular, and hexagonal lattices in the two-dimensional
plane [22]–[24], which are applicable when the position of the nodes in the network is known
exactly or is constrained to a regular structure. In contrast, in many important scenarios, only
a statistical description of the node positions is available, and thus a stochastic spatial model is
the natural choice. In particular, the Poisson point process [25] has been successfully used in the
context of wireless networks, most notably in what concerns connectivity and coverage [26]–
[28], throughput [29], [30], interference [31]–[34], environmental monitoring [35], and sensor
cooperation [36], among other topics.
In this paper, we aim at a mathematical characterization of the secrecy properties of stochastic
wireless networks. The main contributions are as follows:
• Framework for intrinsic security in stochastic networks: We introduce an information-
theoretic definition of the intrinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph), based
on the notion of strong secrecy. Our framework considers spatially scattered users and
eavesdroppers, subject to generic wireless propagation characteristics.
5• Local connectivity in the iS-graph: We provide a complete probabilistic characterization of
both in-degree and out-degree of a typical node in the Poisson iS-graph, using fundamental
tools of stochastic geometry.
• Techniques for communication with enhanced secrecy: We proposed sectorized transmission
and eavesdropper neutralization as two techniques for enhancing the secrecy of communi-
cation, and quantify their effectiveness in terms of the resulting average node degrees.
• Maximum secrecy rate (MSR) in the iS-graph: We provide a complete probabilistic char-
acterization of the MSR between a typical node of the Poisson iS-graph and each of its
neighbors. In addition, we derive expressions for the probability of existence of a non-zero
MSR, and the probability of secrecy outage.
• The case of colluding eavesdroppers: We provide a characterization of the MSR and average
node degrees for scenarios in which the eavesdroppers are allowed to collude, i.e, exchange
and combine information. We quantify exactly how eavesdropper collusion degrades the
secrecy properties of the legitimate nodes, in comparison to a non-colluding scenario.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. Section III char-
acterizes local connectivity in the Poisson iS-graph. Section IV analyzes two techniques for
enhancing the secrecy of communication. Section V considers the MSR between a node and its
neighbours. Section VI characterizes the case of colluding eavesdroppers. Section VII concludes
the paper and summarizes important findings.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We start by describing our system model and defining our measures of secrecy. The notation
and symbols used throughout the paper are summarized in Table I.
A. Wireless Propagation Characteristics
In a wireless environment, the received power Prx(xi, xj) associated with the link −−→xixj can
be written as
Prx(xi, xj) = Pℓ · g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj), (1)
where Pℓ is the (common) transmit power of the legitimate nodes; and g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj) is the
power gain of the link −−→xixj , where the random variable (RV) Zxi,xj represents the random
6propagation effects (such as multipath fading or shadowing) associated with link −−→xixj . We
consider that the Zxi,xj , xi 6= xj are independent identically distributed (IID) RVs with common
probability density function (PDF) fZ(z), and that Zxi,xj = Zxj ,xi due to channel reciprocity.
The channel gain g(xi, xj, Zxi,xj) is considered constant (quasi-static) throughout the use of the
communications channel, which corresponds to channels with a large coherence time. The gain
function is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
1) g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj) depends on xi and xj only through the link length |xi − xj |; with abuse
of notation, we can write g(r, z) , g(xi, xj , z)||xi−xj |→r.
2) g(r, z) is continuous and strictly decreasing in r.
3) limr→∞ g(r, z) = 0.
The proposed model is general enough to account for common choices of g. One example is
the unbounded model where g(r, z) = z
r2b
. The term 1
r2b
accounts for the far-field path loss with
distance, where the amplitude loss exponent b is environment-dependent and can approximately
range from 0.8 (e.g., hallways inside buildings) to 4 (e.g., dense urban environments), with b = 1
corresponding to free space propagation. This model is analytically convenient [31], but since
the gain becomes unbounded as the distance approaches zero, it must be used with care for
extremely dense networks. Another example is the bounded model where g(r, z) = z
1+r2b
. This
model has the same far-field dependence as the unbounded model, but eliminates the singularity
at the origin. Unfortunately, it often leads to intractable analytical results. The effect of the
singularity at r = 0 on the performance evaluation of a wireless system is considered in [37].
Furthermore, by appropriately choosing of the distribution of Zxi,xj , both models can account
for various random propagation effects [31], including:
1) Path loss only: Zxi,xj = 1.
2) Path loss and Nakagami-m fading: Zxi,xj = α2xi,xj , where α2xi,xj ∼ G(m, 1m).2
3) Path loss and log-normal shadowing: Zxi,xj = exp(2σsGxi,xj), where Gxi,xj ∼ N (0, 1).3
The term exp(2σsGxi,xj) has a log-normal distribution, where σs is the shadowing coeffi-
cient.
4) Path loss, Nakagami-m fading, and log-normal shadowing: Zxi,xj = α2xi,xj exp(2σsGxi,xj),
2We use G(x, θ) to denote a gamma distribution with mean xθ and variance xθ2.
3We use N (µ, σ2) to denote a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
7where α2xi,xj ∼ G(m, 1m), Gxi,xj ∼ N (0, 1), with αxi,xj independent of Gxi,xj .
B. Wireless Information-Theoretic Security
We now define our measure of secrecy more precisely. While our main interest is targeted
towards the behavior of large-scale networks, we briefly review the setup for a single legitimate
link with a single eavesdropper. The results thereof will serve as basis for the notion of iS-graph
to be established later.
Consider the model depicted in Fig. 1, where a legitimate user (Alice) wants to send messages
to another user (Bob). Alice encodes a message s, represented by a discrete RV, into a codeword,
represented by the complex random sequence of length n, xn = (x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ Cn, for
transmission over the channel. Bob observes the output of a discrete-time channel (the legitimate
channel), which at time i is given by
yℓ(i) = hℓ · x(i) + wℓ(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where hℓ ∈ C is the quasi-static amplitude gain of the legitimate channel,4 and wℓ(i) ∼ Nc(0, σ2ℓ )
is AWGN with power σ2ℓ per complex sample.5 Bob makes a decision sˆℓ on s based on the
output yℓ, incurring in an error probability equal to P{sˆℓ 6= s}. A third party (Eve) is also
capable of eavesdropping on Alice’s transmissions. Eve observes the output of a discrete-time
channel (the eavesdropper’s channel), which at time i is given by
ye(i) = he · x(i) + we(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where he ∈ C is the quasi-static amplitude gain of the eavesdropper channel, and we(i) ∼
Nc(0, σ2e ) is AWGN with power σ2e per complex sample. It is assumed that the signals x, hℓ,
he, wℓ, and we are mutually independent. Each codeword transmitted by Alice is subject to the
average power constraint of Pℓ per complex symbol, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E{|x(i)|2} ≤ Pℓ. (2)
4The amplitude gain h can be related to the power gain in (1) as g(rℓ, Zℓ) = |hℓ|2, where rℓ and Zℓ are, respectively, the
length and random propagation effects of the legitimate link.
5We use Nc(0, σ2) to denote a CS complex Gaussian distribution, where the real and imaginary parts are IID N (0, σ2/2).
8We define the transmission rate between Alice and Bob as
R ,
H(s)
n
,
where H(·) denotes the entropy function.
Throughout the paper, we use strong secrecy as the condition for information-theoretic security,
and define it as follows [38].
Definition 2.1 (Strong Secrecy): The rate R∗ is said to be achievable with strong secrecy if
∀ǫ > 0, for sufficiently large n, there exists an encoder-decoder pair with rate R satisfying the
following conditions:
R ≥ R∗ − ǫ,
H(s|yne ) ≥ H(s)− ǫ,
P{sˆℓ 6= s} ≤ ǫ.
We define the maximum secrecy rate (MSR) Rs of the legitimate channel to be the maximum
rate R∗ that is achievable with strong secrecy.6 If the legitimate link operates at a rate below
the MSR Rs, there exists an encoder-decoder pair such that the eavesdropper is unable to obtain
additional information about s from the observation yne , in the sense that H(s|yne ) approaches
H(s) as the codeword length n grows. It was shown in [16], [39] that for a given realization of
the channel gains hℓ, he, the MSR of the Gaussian wiretap channel is
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · |hℓ|2
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · |he|2
σ2e
)]+
, (3)
in bits per complex dimension, where [x]+ = max{x, 0}.7 In the next sections, we use these
basic results to analyze secrecy in large-scale networks.
6See [20] for a comparison between the concepts of weak and strong secrecy. In the case of Gaussian noise, the MSR is the
same under the weak and strong secrecy conditions.
7Operationally, the MSR Rs can be achieved if Alice first estimates hℓ and he (i.e., has full CSI), and then uses a code that
achieves MSR in the AWGN channel. Estimation of he is possible, for instance, when Eve is another active user in the wireless
network, so that Alice can estimate the eavesdropper’s channel during Eve’s transmissions. As we shall see, the iS-graph model
presented in this paper relies on an outage formulation, and therefore does not make assumptions concerning availability of full
CSI.
9C. iS-Graph
Consider a wireless network where legitimate nodes and potential eavesdroppers are randomly
scattered in space, according to some point process. The iS-graph is a convenient geometrical
representation of the information-theoretically secure links that can be established on such
network. In the following, we introduce a precise definition of the iS-graph, based on the notion
of strong secrecy.
Definition 2.2 (iS-graph): Let Πℓ = {xi} ⊂ Rd denote the set of legitimate nodes, and
Πe = {ei} ⊂ Rd denote the set of eavesdroppers. The iS-graph is the directed graph G = {Πℓ, E}
with vertex set Πℓ and edge set
E = {−−→xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺}, (4)
where ̺ is a threshold representing the prescribed infimum secrecy rate for each communication
link; and Rs(xi, xj) is the MSR, for a given realization of the channel gains, of the link between
the transmitter xi and the receiver xj , given by
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, xj)
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, e
∗)
σ2e
)]+
, (5)
with
e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
Prx(xi, ek). (6)
This definition presupposes that the eavesdroppers are not allowed to collude (i.e., they cannot
exchange or combine information), and therefore only the eavesdropper with the strongest
received signal from xi determines the MSR between xi and xj . The case of colluding eaves-
droppers is analyzed in Section VI.
The iS-graph admits an outage interpretation, in the sense that legitimate nodes set a target
secrecy rate ̺ at which they transmit without knowing the channel state information (CSI) of
the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. In this context, an edge between two nodes signifies
that the corresponding channel is not in secrecy outage.
Consider now the particular scenario where the following conditions hold: (a) the infimum
desired secrecy rate is zero, i.e., ̺ = 0; (b) the wireless environment introduces only path loss,
i.e., Zxi,xj = 1 in (1); and (c) the noise powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are
equal, i.e., σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2. Note that by setting ̺ = 0, we are considering the existence of secure
links, in the sense that an edge −−→xixj is present if and only if Rs(xi, xj) > 0. Thus, a positive (but
10
possibly small) rate exists at which xi can transmit to xj with information-theoretic security. In
this scenario, (5) reduces to8
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · g(|xi − xj |)
σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · g(|xi − e∗|)
σ2
)]+
, (7)
where
e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|, (8)
i.e., e∗ is the eavesdropper closest to the transmitter xi. Since g(·) is strictly decreasing with its
argument, the edge set E in (4) simplifies in this case to
E =
{−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
}
, (9)
i.e., the transmitter xi can communicate with information-theoretic security with xj at some
positive rate if and only if xj is closer to xi than any other eavesdropper. Thus, in the special
case where ̺ = 0, Zxi,xj = 1, and σ2ℓ = σ2e , the iS-graph is characterized by a simple geometrical
description. Fig. 2 shows an example of such an iS-graph. Note that the description in (9) –
and therefore all results that will follow from it – do not depend on the specific form of the
function g(r), as long as it satisfies the conditions in Section II-A. The special case in (9)
was also considered in [21], starting from a formulation of security based on geometrical – not
information-theoretic – considerations.
D. Poisson iS-Graph
The spatial location of the nodes can be modeled either deterministically or stochastically.
However, in many important scenarios, only a statistical description of the node positions is
available, and thus a stochastic spatial model is more suitable. In particular, when the node
positions are unknown to the network designer a priori, we may as well treat them as completely
random according to a homogeneous Poisson point process [25].9 The Poisson process has
maximum entropy among all homogeneous processes [40], and serves as a simple and useful
model for the position of nodes in a network.
8For notational simplicity, when Z = 1, we omit the second argument of the function g(r, z) and simply use g(r).
9The spatial Poisson process is a natural choice in such situation because, given that a node is inside a region R, the PDF of
its position is conditionally uniform over R.
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Definition 2.3 (Poisson iS-graph): The Poisson iS-graph is an iS-graph where Πℓ,Πe ⊂ Rd
are mutually independent, homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λℓ and λe,
respectively.
In the remainder of the paper (unless otherwise indicated), we focus on Poisson iS-graphs in
R2. We use {Rℓ,i}∞i=1 and {Re,i}∞i=1 to denote the ordered random distances between the origin
of the coordinate system and the nodes in Πℓ and Πe, respectively, where Rℓ,1 ≤ Rℓ,2 ≤ . . . and
Re,1 ≤ Re,2 ≤ . . . .
III. LOCAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
In graph theory, the node degrees are an important property of a graph, since they describe
the connectivity between a node and its immediate neighbors. In a graph, the in-degree and
out-degree of a vertex are, respectively, the number of edges entering and exiting the vertex.
Since the iS-graph is a random graph, the in- and out-degrees of the legitimate nodes are RVs.
In this section, we provide a complete probabilistic characterization of both in-degree Nin and
out-degree Nout of a typical node in the Poisson iS-graph.10 We first consider the simplest
case of ̺ = 0 (the existence of secure links), Zxi,xj = 1 (path loss only), and σ2e = σ2ℓ (equal
noise powers) in Sections III-A, III-B, and III-C. This scenario leads to an iS-graph with a
simple geometric description, thus providing various insights that are useful in understanding
more complex cases. Later, in Sections III-D and III-E, we separately analyze how the node
degrees are affected by wireless propagation effects other than path loss (e.g., multipath fading),
a non-zero secrecy rate threshold ̺, and unequal noise powers σ2e , σ2ℓ .
We start by showing that under the simple geometric description in (9), the distributions of
the in- and out-degree of a node depend exclusively on the ratio of densities λℓ
λe
.
Property 3.1: In the case of ̺ = 0, Zxi,xj = 1, and σ2e = σ2ℓ , the probability mass functions
(PMFs) pNout(n) and pNin(n) of a node depend on the densities λℓ and λe only through the
ratio λℓ
λe
.
10In this paper, we analyze the local properties of a typical node in the iS-graph. This notion is made precise in [41, Sec.
4.4] using Palm theory. Specifically, Slivnyak’s theorem states that the properties observed by a typical legitimate node x ∈ Πℓ
are the same as those observed by node 0 in the process Πℓ ∪ {0}. Informally, a typical node of Πℓ is one that is uniformly
picked from a finite region expanding to R2. In this paper, we often omit the word “typical” for brevity.
12
Proof: Consider a given realization of the processes Πℓ and Πe, with densities λℓ and λe,
respectively. This induces an iS-graph G = (Πℓ, E) with vertex set Πℓ and edge set E given by (9).
We now apply the transformation x→√cx in R2, resulting in scaled processes √cΠℓ and √cΠe,
with densities λℓ
c
and λe
c
, respectively. Note that the iS-graph G˘ = {√cΠℓ, E} corresponding to
the scaled processes has exactly the same edge set as G, because the scaling transformation does
not change the geometrical configuration of the network. We then conclude that the node degree
distributions before and after scaling are the same, and hence only depend on the ratio λℓ
λe
. This
concludes the proof.
A. In-Degree Characterization
The characterization of the in-degree relies on the notion of Voronoi tessellation, which we
now introduce. A planar tessellation is a collection of disjoint polygons whose closures cover
R2, and which is locally finite (i.e., the number of polygons intersecting any given compact set
is finite). Given a generic point process Π = {xi} ⊂ R2, we define the Voronoi cell Cxi of the
point xi as the set of points of R2 which are closer to xi than any other point of Π, i.e.,
Cxi = {y ∈ R2 : |y − xi| < |y − xj |, ∀xj 6= xi}.
The collection {Cxi} of all the cells forms a random Voronoi tessellation with respect to the
underlying point process Π. Let C0 denote the typical Voronoi cell, i.e., the Voronoi cell associated
with a point placed at the origin, according to Slivnyak’s theorem. Using the notions just
introduced, the following theorem provides a probabilistic characterization of the in-degree of
the iS-graph.
Theorem 3.1: The in-degree Nin of a typical node in the Poisson iS-graph has the following
moment generating function (MGF)
MNin(s) = E
{
exp
(
λℓ
λe
A˜(es − 1)
)}
, (10)
where A˜ is the area of a typical Voronoi cell induced by a unit-density Poisson process.
Furthermore, all the moments of Nin are given by
E{Nnin} =
n∑
k=1
(
λℓ
λe
)k
S(n, k)E{A˜k}, n ≥ 1, (11)
where S(n, k), 1 ≤ k ≤ n, are the Stirling numbers of the second kind [42, Ch. 24].
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Proof: Using Slivnyak’s theorem [41, Sec. 4.4], we consider the process Πℓ ∪{0} obtained
by adding a legitimate node to the origin of the coordinate system, and denote the in-degree
of the node at the origin by Nin. The RV Nin corresponds to the number of nodes from the
process Πℓ that fall inside the typical Voronoi cell C0 constructed from the process Πe ∪ {0}.
This is depicted in Fig. 4. Denoting the random area of such a cell by A, the MGF of Nin is
given by
MNin(s) = E{esNin}
= E{exp (λℓA(es − 1))},
where we used the fact that conditioned on A, the RV Nin is Poisson distributed with parame-
ter λℓA. If A˜ denotes the random area of a typical Voronoi cell induced by a unit-density Poisson
process, then A˜ = Aλe and (10) follows. This completes the first half of the proof.
To obtain the moments of Nin, we use Dobinski’s formula [43]
∞∑
k=0
kn
e−µµk
k!
=
n∑
k=1
µkS(n, k),
which establishes the relationship between the n-th moment of a Poisson RV with mean µ and
the Stirling numbers of the second kind, S(n, k). Then,
E{Nnin} = E {E{Nnin|A}}
= E
{
n∑
k=1
(λℓA)
kS(n, k)
}
=
n∑
k=1
(
λℓ
λe
)k
S(n, k)E{A˜k},
for n ≥ 1. This is the result in (11) and the second half of proof is concluded.
Equation (11) expresses the moments of Nin in terms of the moments of A˜. Note that the
Stirling numbers of the second kind can be obtained recursively as
S(n, k) = S(n− 1, k − 1) + kS(n− 1, k),
S(n, n) = S(n, 1) = 1,
or explicitly as
S(n, k) =
1
k!
k∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
k
i
)
(k − i)n.
14
Table II provides some values for S(n, k). In general, E{A˜k} cannot be obtained in closed form,
except in the case of k = 1, which is derived below in (14). For k = 2 and k = 3, E{A˜k}
can be expressed as multiple integrals and then computed numerically [44]–[46]. Alternatively,
the moments of A˜ can be determined using Monte Carlo simulation of random Poisson-Voronoi
tessellations [47]–[49]. The first four moments of A˜ are given in Table III.
The above theorem can be used to obtain the in-connectivity properties a node, such as the
in-isolation probability, as given in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1: The average in-degree of a typical node in the Poisson iS-graph is
E{Nin} = λℓ
λe
(12)
and the probability that a typical node cannot receive from anyone with positive secrecy rate
(in-isolation) is
pin−isol = E
{
e−
λℓ
λe
A˜
}
. (13)
Proof: Setting n = 1 in (11), we obtain E{Nin} = λℓλeE{A˜}. Noting that
A˜ =
∫ ∫
R2
1{z ∈ C0}dz,
where C0 is the typical Voronoi cell induced by a unit-density Poisson process Π˜, we can write11
E{A˜} =
∫ ∫
R2
P{z ∈ C0}dz (14)
=
∫ ∫
R2
P{Π˜{Bz(|z|)} = 0}dz (15)
=
∫ 2π
0
∫ ∞
0
e−πr
2
rdrdθ =
= 1.
Equation (14) follows from Fubini’s Theorem, while (15) follows from the fact that, for any
z ∈ R2, the event {z ∈ C0} is equivalent to having no points of Π˜ in Bz(|z|), as depicted in
Fig. 5(a). This completes the proof of (12). To derive (13), note that the RV Nin conditioned
on A is Poisson distributed with parameter λℓA, and thus pin−isol = pNin(0) = E{pNin|A(0)} =
E
{
e−
λℓ
λe
A˜
}
.
11We use Bx(ρ) , {y ∈ R2 : |y − x| ≤ ρ} to denote the closed two-dimensional ball centered at point x, with radius ρ.
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We can obtain an alternative expression for (13) by performing a power series expansion of
the exponential function, resulting in
pin−isol =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!
(
λℓ
λe
)k
E{A˜k}.
This equation expresses pin−isol as a power series with argument λℓλe , since E{A˜k} are determin-
istic. The power series can be truncated, since the summands become smaller as k →∞.
B. Out-Degree Characterization
Theorem 3.2: The out-degree Nout of a typical node in the Poisson iS-graph has the following
geometric PMF
pNout(n) =
(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)n(
λe
λℓ + λe
)
, n ≥ 0. (16)
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ ∪ {0} obtained by adding a legitimate node to the
origin of the coordinate system, and denote the out-degree of the origin by Nout. The RV Nout
corresponds to the number of nodes from the process Πℓ that fall inside the circle with random
radius Re,1 centered at the origin, i.e., Nout = #{Rℓ,i : Rℓ,i < Re,1}. This is depicted in Fig. 3.
To determine the PMF of Nout, consider the one-dimensional arrival processes Π˜ℓ = {R2ℓ,i}∞i=1
and Π˜e = {R2e,i}∞i=1. As can be easily shown using the mapping theorem [25, Section 2.3],
Π˜ℓ and Π˜e are independent homogeneous Poisson processes with arrival rates πλℓ and πλe,
respectively. When there is an arrival in the merged process Π˜ℓ ∪ Π˜e, it comes from process Π˜ℓ
with probability p = πλℓ
πλℓ+πλe
= λℓ
λℓ+λe
, and from Π˜e with probability 1 − p = λeλℓ+λe , and these
events are independent for different arrivals [50]. Since the event {Nout = n} is equivalent to the
occurrence of n arrivals from Π˜ℓ followed by one arrival from Π˜e, then we have the geometric
PMF pNout(n) = pn(1− p), n ≥ 0, with parameter p = λℓλℓ+λe . This is the result in (16) and the
proof is completed.
Note that this particular result was also derived in [21]. The above theorem can be used to
obtain the out-connectivity properties a node, such as the out-isolation probability, as given in
the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2: The average out-degree of a typical node in the Poisson iS-graph is
E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
, (17)
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and the probability that a typical node cannot transmit to anyone with positive secrecy rate
(out-isolation) is
pout−isol =
λe
λℓ + λe
. (18)
Proof: This follows directly from Theorem 3.2.
C. General Relationships Between In- and Out-Degree
We have so far considered the probabilistic distribution of the in- and out-degrees in a separate
fashion. This section establishes a direct comparison between some characteristics of the in- and
out-degrees.
Property 3.2: For the Poisson iS-graph with λℓ > 0 and λe > 0, the average degrees of a
typical node satisfy
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
. (19)
Proof: This follows directly by comparing (17) and (12).
The property E{Nin} = E{Nout} is valid in general for any directed random graph.
Property 3.3: For the Poisson iS-graph with λℓ > 0 and λe > 0, the probabilities of in- and
out-isolation of a typical node satisfy
pin−isol < pout−isol. (20)
Proof: Let Πe{R} , #{Πe ∩ R} denote the number of eavesdroppers inside region R.
With this definition, we can rewrite the edge set E in (9) as
E = {−−→xixj : Πe{Bxi(|xi − xj |} = 0}, (21)
i.e., xi is connected to xj if and only if the ball centered at xi with radius |xi − xj | is free of
eavesdroppers. We consider the process Πℓ ∪ {0} obtained by adding a legitimate node to the
origin of the coordinate system. Let x˘i denote the ordered points in process Πℓ of legitimate
nodes, such that |x˘1| < |x˘2| < . . .. From (21), the node at the origin is out-isolated if and only
if Πe{B0(|x˘j |)} ≥ 1 for all j ≥ 1. This is depicted in Fig. 5(b). Since the balls B0(|x˘j |), j ≥ 1,
are concentric at the origin, we have that
pout−isol = P {Πe{B0(|x˘1|)} ≥ 1} .
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Similarly, we see from (21) that the node at the origin is in-isolated if and only if Πe{Bx˘i(|x˘i|)} ≥
1 for all i ≥ 1. This is depicted in Fig. 5(c). Then,
pin−isol = P
{
∞∧
i=1
Πe{Bx˘i(|x˘i|)} ≥ 1
}
(22)
< P {Πe{Bx˘1(|x˘1|)} ≥ 1} (23)
= P {Πe{B0(|x˘1|)} ≥ 1} (24)
= pout−isol.
The fact that the inequality in (23) is strict proved in Appendix A. Equation (24) follows from
the spatial invariance of the homogeneous Poisson process Πe. This concludes the proof.
Intuitively, out-isolation is more likely than in-isolation because out-isolation only requires that
one or more eavesdroppers are closer than the nearest legitimate node x˘1. On the other hand,
in-isolation requires that every ball Bx˘i(|x˘i|), i ≥ 1, has one or more eavesdroppers, which is
less likely. Property 3.3 can then be restated in the following way: it is easier for an individual
node to be in-connected than out-connected.
D. Effect of the Wireless Propagation Characteristics
We have so far analyzed the local connectivity of the iS-graph in the presence of path loss
only. However, wireless propagation typically introduces random propagation effects such as
multipath fading and shadowing, which are modeled by the RV Zxi,xj in (1). In this section, we
aim to quantify the impact of such propagation effects on the local connectivity of a node.
Considering ̺ = 0, σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2, and arbitrary propagation effects Zxi,xj with PDF fZ(z),
we can combine (5) with the general propagation model of (1) and write
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · g(|xi − xj |, Zxi,xj)
σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · g(|xi − e∗|, Zxi,e∗),
σ2
)]+
,
(25)
where
e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
g(|xi − ek|, Zxi,ek). (26)
After some algebra, the edge set for the resulting iS-graph can be written as
E =
{−−→xixj : g(|xi−xj |, Zxi,xj) > g(|xi− e∗|, Zxi,e∗), e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
g(|xi− ek|, Zxi,ek)
}
. (27)
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Unlike the case of path-loss only, where the out-connections of a node are determined only by
the closest eavesdropper, here they are determined by the eavesdropper with the least attenuated
channel. We start by characterizing the distribution of the out-degree by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3: For the Poisson iS-graph with propagation effects Zxi,xj whose PDF is given
by a continuous function fZ(z), the PMF of the out-degree Nout of a typical node is given in
(16), and is invariant with respect to fZ(z).
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ∪{0} obtained by adding a legitimate node to the origin
of the coordinate system, and denote the out-degree of the node at the origin by Nout. For the
legitimate nodes, let the distances to the origin (not necessarily ordered) be Rℓ,i , |xi|, xi ∈ Πℓ,
and the corresponding channel propagation effects be Zℓ,i. Similarly, we can define Re,i , |ei|,
ei ∈ Πe, and Ze,i for the eavesdroppers. Define also the loss function as l(r, z) , 1/g(r, z). We
can now consider the one-dimensional loss processes for the legitimate nodes, Λℓ , {Lℓ,i}∞i=1
with Lℓ,i , l(Rℓ,i, Zℓ,i), and for the eavesdroppers, Λe , {Le,i}∞i=1 with Le,i , l(Re,i, Ze,i). Note
that loss process {Lℓ,i} can be interpreted as a stochastic mapping of the distance process {Rℓ,i},
where the mapping depends on the random sequence {Zℓ,i} (a similar statement can be made for
{Le,i}, {Re,i}, and {Ze,i}). With these definitions, the out-degree of node 0 can be expressed as
Nout = #{Lℓ,i : Lℓ,i < mink Le,k}, i.e., it is the number of occurrences in the process Λℓ before
the first occurrence in the process Λe. In the remainder of the proof, we first characterize the
processes Λℓ and Λe; then, using appropriate transformations, we map them into homogeneous
processes, where the distribution of Nout can be readily determined.
Since the RVs {Zℓ,i} are IID in i and independent of {Rℓ,i}, we know from the marking
theorem [25, Section 5.2] that the points {(Rℓ,i, Zℓ,i)} form a non-homogeneous Poisson process
on R+×R+ with density 2πλℓrfZ(z), where fZ(z) is the PDF of Zℓ,i. Then, from the mapping
theorem [25, Section 2.3], Λℓ = {l(Rℓ,i, Zℓ,i)} is also a non-homogeneous Poisson process on
R+ with density denoted by λΛℓ(l).12 Furthermore, the process Λℓ can be made homogeneous
through the transformation MΛℓ(t) ,
∫ t
0
λΛℓ(l)dl, such that MΛℓ(Λℓ) is a Poisson process with
12In our theorem, the continuity of the function fZ(z) is sufficient to ensure that Λℓ is a Poisson process. In general, we may
allow Dirac impulses in fZ(z), as long as the distinct points {(Rℓ,i, Zℓ,i)} do not pile on top of one another when forming the
process Λℓ = {l(Rℓ,i, Zℓ,i)}.
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density 1. The homogenizing function MΛℓ(t) can be calculated as follows
MΛℓ(t) =
∫ t
0
λΛℓ(l)dl
=
∫ ∫
0<l(r,z)<t
2πλℓrfZℓ(z)drdz
Using a completely analogous reasoning for the process Λe, its homogenizing function MΛe(t)
can be written as
MΛe(t) =
∫ t
0
λΛe(l)dl
=
∫ ∫
0<l(r,z)<t
2πλerfZe(z)drdz.
But since fZℓ(z) = fZe(z), it follows that MΛℓ(t) =
λℓ
λe
MΛe(t). The out-degree Nout can
now be easily obtained in the homogenized domain. Consider that both processes Λℓ and
Λe are homogenized by the same transformation MΛℓ(·), such that MΛℓ(Λl) and MΛℓ(Λe) are
independent Poisson processes with density 1 and λe
λℓ
. Furthermore, since MΛℓ(·) is monotonically
increasing, Nout can be re-expressed as
Nout = #{Lℓ,i : Lℓ,i < min
k
Le,k},
= #{Lℓ,i : MΛℓ(Lℓ,i) < MΛℓ(min
k
Le,k)}.
In this homogenized domain, the propagation effects have disappeared, and the problem is
now equivalent to that in Theorem 3.2. Specifically, when there is an arrival in the merged
process MΛℓ(Λℓ) ∪MΛℓ(Λe), it comes from process MΛℓ(Λℓ) with probability p = 11+λe/λℓ =
λℓ
λℓ+λe
, and from MΛℓ(Λe) with probability 1 − p = λeλℓ+λe . As a result, Nout has the geometric
PMF pNout(n) = pn(1 − p), n ≥ 0, with parameter p = λℓλℓ+λe . This is exactly the same PMF
as the one given in (16), and is therefore invariant with respect to the distribution fZ(z). This
concludes the proof.
Intuitively, the propagation environment affect both the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers
in the same way (in the sense that Zℓ,i and Ze,i have the same distribution), such that the PMF
of Nout is invariant with respect to the PDF fZ(z). However, the PMF of Nin does depend on
fZ(z) in a non-trivial way, although its mean remains the same, as specified in the following
corollary.
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Corollary 3.3: For the Poisson iS-graph with propagation effects Zxi,xj distributed according
to fZ(z), the average node degrees are
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
, (28)
for any distribution fZ(z).
Proof: This follows directly from Theorem 3.3 and the fact that E{Nin} = E{Nout} in any
directed random graph.
We thus conclude that the expected node degrees are invariant with respect to the distribution
characterizing the propagation effects, and always equal the ratio λℓ
λe
of spatial densities.
E. Effect of the Secrecy Rate Threshold and Noise Powers
We have so far analyzed the local connectivity of the iS-graph based on the existence of
positive MSR, by considering that the infimum desired secrecy rate is zero, i.e., ̺ = 0 in (4).
This implies that the edge −−→xixj is present if and only if there exists a positive rate at which xi
can transmit to xj with information-theoretic security. We have furthermore considered that the
noise powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are equal, i.e., σ2ℓ = σ2e in (5). Under
these two conditions, the iS-graph can be reduced to the simple geometric description in (9),
where the edge −−→xixj is present if and only if xj is closer to xi than any other eavesdropper.
In this section, we study the effect of non-zero secrecy rate threshold, i.e., ̺ > 0, and unequal
noise powers, i.e., σ2ℓ 6= σ2e , on the iS-graph.
Considering Zxi,xj = 1 and arbitrary noise powers σ2ℓ , σ2e , we can combine (5) with the general
propagation model of (1) and write
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · g(|xi − xj |)
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · g(|xi − e∗|)
σ2e
)]+
, (29)
where
e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|. (30)
We can now replace this expression for Rs(xi, xj) into (4) while allowing an arbitrary threshold ̺.
After some algebra, the edge set for the resulting iS-graph can be written as
E =
{−−→xixj : g(|xi − xj |) > σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺g(|xi − e∗|) + σ
2
ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1), e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
}
. (31)
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By setting ̺ = 0 and σ2ℓ = σ2e in (31) we obtain the edge set in (9) as a special case. However,
for arbitrary parameters ̺, σ2ℓ , σ2e , the iS-graph can no longer be characterized by the simple
geometric description of (9). We now analyze the impact of the secrecy rate threshold ̺ and the
noise powers σ2ℓ , σ2e on the average node degrees, for a general channel gain function g(r).
Property 3.4: For the Poisson iS-graph with edge set in (31) and any channel gain func-
tion g(r) satisfying the conditions in Section II-A, the average node degrees E{Nout} = E{Nin}
are decreasing functions of ̺ and σ2ℓ , and increasing functions of σ2e .
Proof: We prove the theorem with a coupling argument. We consider the process Πℓ ∪ {0}
obtained by adding a legitimate node to the origin of the coordinate system, and denote the
out-degree of the node at the origin by Nout. Let Re,1 , minei∈Πe |ei| be the random distance
between the origin and its closest eavesdropper. We first consider the variation of E{Nout} with
̺, for fixed σ2ℓ , σ2e . Let X(̺) ,
{
xi ∈ Πℓ : g(|xi|) > σ
2
ℓ
σ2e
2̺g(Re,1) +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1)
}
be the set of
legitimate nodes to which the origin is out-connected. With this definition,
E{Nout(̺)} = EΠℓ,Re,1{#X(̺)},
where we have explicitly indicated the dependence of E{Nout} on ̺. Since σ
2
ℓ
σ2e
2̺g(Re,1)+
σ2ℓ
Pl
(2̺−
1) is increasing in ̺, for each realization of Π and Re,1 we have that X(̺1) ⊇ X(̺2), when-
ever 0 < ̺1 < ̺2. This implies that EΠℓ,Re,1{#X(̺1)} ≥ EΠℓ,Re,1{#X(̺2)}, or equivalently,
E{Nout(̺1)} ≥ E{Nout(̺2)} for 0 < ̺1 < ̺2, and thus E{Nout(̺)} is decreasing with ̺. A
similar argument holds for the parameters σ2ℓ , σ2e , showing that E{Nout} is decreasing with σ2ℓ
and increasing with σ2e . This concludes the proof.
In essence, by increasing the secrecy rate threshold ̺, the requirement Cs(xi, xj) > ̺ for any
two nodes xi, xj to be securely connected becomes stricter, and thus the local connectivity (as
measured by the average node degrees) becomes worse. On the other hand, increasing σ2ℓ or
decreasing σ2e makes the requirement Cs(xi, xj) > ̺ harder to satisfy for any two legitimate
nodes xi, xj . As a result, the local connectivity (as measured by the average node degrees)
becomes worse.
The exact dependence of the average node degree on the parameters ̺, σ2ℓ , σ2e depends on the
function g(r). To gain further insights, we now consider the specific channel gain function
g(r) =
1
r2b
, r > 0. (32)
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This function has been widely used in the literature to model path loss behavior as a function of
distance, and satisfies the conditions in Section II-A. Replacing (32) into (31) and rearranging
terms, the edge set reduces to
E =
−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e
∗|(
σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1)|xi − e∗|2b
)1/2b , e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
} .
(33)
For this case, a characterization of the first order moments of Nin and Nout is possible, and is
provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4: For the Poisson iS-graph with secrecy rate threshold ̺, noise powers σ2ℓ , σ2e ,
and channel gain function g(r) = 1
r2b
, the average node degrees are
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = π2λℓλe
∫ ∞
0
xe−πλex(
σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1)xb
)1/bdx (34)
≤ λℓ
λe
1(
σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ(πλe)b
(2̺ − 1)
)1/b . (35)
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ∪{0} obtained by adding a legitimate node to the origin
of the coordinate system, and denote the out-degree of the node at the origin by Nout. Let
Re,1 , minei∈Πe |ei| be the random distance between the origin and its closest eavesdropper.
Define the function
ψ(r) ,
r(
σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1)r2b
)1/2b , r ≥ 0, (36)
so that (33) can simply be written as E = {−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < ψ(|xi − e∗|)}. This function is
depicted in Figure 8. The average out-degree is then given by
E{Nout} = EΠℓ,Re,1{Πℓ{B0(ψ(Re,1))}}
= πλℓERe,1{ψ2(Re,1)}
Defining X , R2e,1, we can write
E{Nout} = πλℓEX
 X(σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1)Xb
)1/b
 (37)
= πλℓ
∫ ∞
0
x(
σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1)xb
)1/bπλee−πλexdx,
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where we used the fact that X is an exponential RV with mean 1
πλe
. This proves the result in
(34). To obtain the upper bound, we note that the function inside the expectation in (37) is
concave in x, and apply Jensen’s inequality as follows
E{Nout} ≤ λℓ
λe
1(
σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2ℓ
Pℓ(πλe)b
(2̺ − 1)
)1/b .
This is the result in (35). Noting that E{Nin} = E{Nout} for any directed random graph, the
proof is concluded.
F. Numerical Results
Figure 6 compares the PMFs of the in- and out-degree of a node. We clearly observe that the
RV Nin does not have a geometric distribution, unlike the RV Nout. However, the two RVs have
the same mean λℓ
λe
, according to Property 3.2.
Figure 7 compares the probabilities of out-isolation and in-isolation of a node for various
ratios λe
λℓ
. The curve for pout−isol was plotted using the closed form expression in (18). The
curve for pin−isol was obtained according to (13) through Monte Carlo simulation of the random
area A˜ of a typical Voronoi cell, induced by a unit-density Poisson process. We observe that
pin−isol < pout−isol for any fixed λeλℓ , as proved in Property 3.3.
Figure 9 illustrates the effect of the secrecy rate threshold ̺ on the average node degrees. For
the case of g(r) = 1
r2b
in particular, it compares the exact value of E{Nout} given in (34) with
its upper bound in (35). We observe that the average node degree attains its maximum value
of λℓ
λe
= 10 at ̺ = 0, and is monotonically decreasing with ̺. As proved in Property 3.4, such
behavior occurs for any function g(r) satisfying the conditions in Section II-A. Furthermore, we
can show that the upper bound is asymptotically tight – in the sense that the difference between
the exact average node degree and its upper bound approaches 0 – in the following two extreme
cases:
• ̺ → 0: In this regime, both (34) and (35) approach λℓ
λe
(
σ2e
σ2ℓ
)1/b
, and thus the bound is
asymptotically tight.
• Pℓ →∞: In this high-SNR regime, both (34) and (35) converge to λℓλe
(
σ2e
σ2ℓ
2−̺
)1/b
, and thus
the bound is asymptotically tight.
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IV. TECHNIQUES FOR COMMUNICATION WITH ENHANCED SECRECY
Based on the results derived in Section III, we observe that even a small density of eavesdrop-
pers is enough to significantly disrupt connectivity of the iS-graph. For example, if the density
of legitimate nodes is half the density of eavesdroppers, then from (19) the average node degree
is reduced to 2. In this section, we explore two techniques for communication with enhanced se-
crecy: i) sectorized transmission, whereby each legitimate node is able to transmit independently
in L sectors of the plane (e.g., through the use of directional antennas); and ii) eavesdropper
neutralization, whereby legitimate nodes are able to physically monitor its surrounding area and
guarantee that there are no eavesdroppers inside a neutralization region Θ (e.g., by neutralizing
such eavesdroppers). For these two techniques, we quantify the improvements in terms of the
resulting average node degree of the iS-graph.
A. Sectorized Transmission
We have so far assumed that the legitimate nodes employ omnidirectional antennas, distributing
power equally among all directions. We now consider that each legitimate node is able to transmit
independently in L sectors of the plane, with L ≥ 1. This can be accomplished, for example,
through the use of L directional antennas. In this section, we characterize the impact of the
number of sectors L on the local connectivity of the iS-graph.
With each node xi ∈ Π, we associate L transmission sectors {S(l)i }Ll=1 , defined as
S(l)i ,
{
z ∈ R2 : φi + (l − 1)2π
L
< ∠−→xiz < φi + l2π
L
}
, l = 1 . . . L,
where {φi}∞i=1 are random offset angles with an arbitrary joint distribution. The resulting iS-graph GL =
{Πℓ, EL} has an edge set given by
EL =
{−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe∩S∗
|xi − ek|, S∗ = {S(l)i : xj ∈ S(l)i }
}
. (38)
Here, S∗ is the transmission sector of xi that contains the destination node xj , and e∗ is the
eavesdropper inside S∗ that is closest to the transmitter xi. Then, the secure link −−→xixj exists if
and only if xj is closer to xi than any other eavesdropper inside the same transmission sector
where the destination xj is located. We start by characterizing the distribution of the out-degree
by the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.1: For the Poisson iS-graph GL with L sectors, the out-degree Nout of a node has
the following negative binomial PMF
pNout(n) =
(
L+ n− 1
L− 1
)(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)n(
λe
λℓ + λe
)L
, n ≥ 0. (39)
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ∪{0} obtained by adding a legitimate node to the origin
of the coordinate system, and denote the out-degree of the node at the origin by Nout. This is
depicted in Fig. 10. Consider the set of legitimate nodes in the sector S(l). Let {R(l)ℓ,i}∞i=1 be
the distances (not necessarily ordered) from these legitimate nodes and the origin, such that
R
(l)
ℓ,i = |x(l)i |, with {x(l)i } = Πℓ ∩S(l). For the eavesdroppers, we similarly define {R(l)e,i}∞i=1, such
that R(l)e,i = |e(l)i | with {e(l)i } = Πe ∩S(l). Because the sectors S(l) are non-overlapping and Πℓ is
Poisson, the processes {R(l)ℓ,i}∞i=1 are independent for different l (a similar argument can be made
for the independence of {R(l)e,i}∞i=1 for different l). As a result, we can analyze the out-degrees of
node 0 in each sector, and add these independent RVs to obtain the total out-degree. Specifically,
Nout =
L∑
l=1
N
(l)
out, (40)
where the RVs
N
(l)
out , #{R(l)ℓ,i : R(l)ℓ,i < min
k
R
(l)
e,k},
are IID in l.
From the mapping theorem, we know that {(R(l)ℓ,i)2}∞i=1 and {(R(l)e,i)2}∞i=1 are homogeneous
Poisson processes with rates πλℓ
L
and πλe
L
, respectively. Following the steps analogous to the proof
of Theorem 3.2, we can show that each RV N (l)out has the geometric PMF pN(l)out(n) = p
n(1− p),
n ≥ 0, with parameter p = λℓ
λℓ+λe
. In other words, each RV N (l)out has the same distribution of the
total out-degree with L = 1. The PMF of Nout with L sectors can be obtained through convolution
of the individual PMFs p
N
(l)
out
, and results in a negative binomial PMF with L degrees of freedom
having the same parameter p, i.e., pNout(n) =
(
L+n−1
L−1
)
pn(1− p)L, n ≥ 0, with p = λℓ
λℓ+λe
. This
is the result in (39) and the proof is completed.
When L = 1, (39) reduces to the PMF without sectorization given in (16), as expected.
The above theorem directly gives the average node degrees as a function of L, as given in the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.1: For the Poisson iS-graph GL with L sectors, the average node degrees are
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = Lλℓ
λe
. (41)
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Proof: Using (40), we have that E{Nout} = LE{Nout,l} = L p1−p , with p = λℓλℓ+λe . In
addition, we have that E{Nin} = E{Nout} for any directed random graph, and (41) follows.
We conclude that the expected node degrees increases linearly with the number of sectors L,
and hence sectorized transmission is an effective technique for enhancing the secrecy of commu-
nications. Figure 10 provides an intuitive understanding of why sectorization works. Specifically,
if there was no sectorization, node 0 would be out-isolated, due to the close proximity of the
eavesdropper in sector S(4). However, if we allow independent transmissions in 4 non-overlapping
sectors, that same eavesdropper can only hear the transmissions inside sector S(4). Thus, even
though node 0 is out-isolated with respect to sector S(4), it may still communicate securely with
legitimate nodes in sectors S(1), S(2), and S(3).
B. Eavesdropper Neutralization
In some scenarios, the legitimate nodes may be able to physically inspect its surrounding area
and guarantee that there are no eavesdroppers inside a neutralization region Θ (for example, by
deactivating such eavesdroppers). In this section, we characterize the impact of such region on
the local connectivity of node.
With each node xi ∈ Πℓ, we associate a neutralization set Θi around xi that is guaranteed
to be free of eavesdroppers. The total neutralization region Θ can then be seen as a Boolean
model with points {xi} and associated sets {Θi}, i.e.,13
Θ =
∞⋃
i=1
(xi +Θi).
Since the homogeneous Poisson process Πℓ is stationary, it follows that Θ is also stationary, in
the sense that its distribution is translation-invariant. Since eavesdroppers cannot occur inside Θ,
the effective eavesdropper process after neutralization is Πe ∩Θ, where Θ , R2\Θ denotes the
complement of Θ.14 The resulting iS-graph GΘ = {Πℓ, EΘ} has an edge set given by
EΘ =
{−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe∩Θ
|xi − ek|
}
(42)
13In other fields such as materials science, the points {xi} are also called germs, and the sets {Θi} are also called grains.
14In the materials science literature, Θ is typically referred to as the occupied region, since it is occupied by grains. In our
problem, however, Θ corresponds to a vacant region, in the sense that it is free of eavesdroppers. To prevent confusion with
the literature, we avoid the use of the terms “occupied” and “vacant” altogether.
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i.e., the secure link−−→xixj exists if and only if xj is closer to xi than any other eavesdropper that has
not been neutralized. Since Πe∩Θ ⊆ Πe, it is intuitively obvious that eavesdropper neutralization
improves the local connectivity, and that such improvement is monotonic with the area of the
neutralization set Θi. In the following, we consider the case of a circular neutralization set,
i.e, Θi = B0(ρ), where ρ is a deterministic neutralization radius. We denote the corresponding
iS-graph by Gρ. Even in this simple scenario, the full distributions of the corresponding node
degrees Nin and Nout are difficult to obtain, since the underlying process Πe∩Θ is quite complex
to characterize. However, it is easier to carry out an analysis of the first order moments, namely
of E{Nout}. We can use this metric to compare eavesdropper neutralization with the other
techniques discussed in this paper, in terms of their effectiveness in enhancing security. The
following theorem provides the desired result.
Theorem 4.2: For the Poisson iS-graph Gρ with neutralization radius ρ, the average node
degrees are lower-bounded by
E{Nin} = E{Nout} ≥ λℓ
λe
(
πλeρ
2 + eπλℓρ
2
)
. (43)
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ∪{0} obtained by adding a legitimate node to the origin
of the coordinate system, and denote the out-degree of the node at the origin by Nout. This
is depicted in Fig. 11. Let Re,1 , minek∈Πe∩Θ |ek| be the random distance between the first
non-neutralized eavesdropper and the origin. Let D(a, b) , {x ∈ R2 : a ≤ |x| ≤ b} denote the
annular region between radiuses a and b, and A{R} denote the area of the arbitrary region R.
Noting that
Nout =
∑
xi∈Πℓ
1{|xi| < Re,1}
=
∫ ∫
R2
1{|x| < Re,1}Πℓ(dx),
we can use Fubini’s theorem to write
E{Nout} = λℓ
∫ ∫
R2
Px{|x| < Re,1}dx
= λℓπρ
2 + λℓ
∫ ∫
D(ρ,∞)
Px{|x| < Re,1}dx, (44)
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where Px{·} denotes the Palm probability associated with point x of process Πℓ.15 Appendix B
shows that the integrand above satisfies
Px{|x| < Re,1} ≥ exp
(
−πλee−λℓπρ2(|x|2 − ρ2)
)
. (45)
Replacing (45) into (44), we obtain
E{Nout} ≥ λℓπρ2 + λℓ
∫ ∫
D(ρ,∞)
exp
(
−πλee−λℓπρ2(|x|2 − ρ2)
)
dx
= λℓπρ
2 +
λℓ
λe
eλℓπρ
2
.
Rearranging terms and noting that E{Nin} = E{Nout} for any directed random graph, we obtain
the desired result in (43). This concludes the proof.
We conclude that the expected node degrees increases at a rate that is at least exponential
with the neutralization radius ρ, making eavesdropper neutralization an effective technique for
enhancing secure connectivity. Such exponential dependence is intimately tied to the fact that the
fractional area pΘ = 1− e−λℓπρ2 of the neutralization region Θ also approaches 1 exponentially
as ρ increases.
C. Numerical Results
Figure 12 illustrates effectiveness of eavesdropper neutralization in enhancing secure connec-
tivity. In particular, it plots the average node degree versus the neutralization radius ρ, for various
values of λe. We observe that E{Nout} increases at a rate that is at least exponential with the
neutralization radius ρ, as expected from (43). Furthermore, the analytical lower-bound is in
general very close to the simulated value of E{Nout}, and becomes tight in the following two
asymptotic cases:
• ρ → 0: In this regime, the neutralization region vanishes, and therefore E{Nout} → λℓλe ,
as given in (19). Since right side of (43) also approaches λℓ
λe
as ρ → 0, the bound is
asymptotically tight.
• λe →∞: In this regime, an eavesdropper will occurs a.s. at a distance close to ρ from the
origin. As a result, E{Nout} is approaches the expected number of legitimate nodes inside
15Informally, the Palm probability Px{·} can be interpreted as the conditional probability P{·|x ∈ Πℓ}. Since the conditioning
event has probability zero, such conditional probability is ambiguous without further explanation. Palm theory makes this notion
mathematically precise (see [41, Sec. 4.4] for a detailed treatment).
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the ball B0(ρ), i.e., λℓπρ2. Since right side of (43) also approaches λℓπρ2 as λe →∞, the
bound is asymptotically tight.
V. MAXIMUM SECRECY RATE IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
In this section, we analyze the MSR between a node and each of its neighbours, as well as
the probability of existence of a non-zero MSR, and the probability of secrecy outage.
A. Distribution of the Maximum Secrecy Rate
Considering the coordinate system depicted in Fig. 3 and using (7), the MSR Rs,i between
the node at the origin and its i-th closest neighbour, i ≥ 1, can be written for a given realization
of the node positions Πℓ and Πe as
Rs,i =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ
R2bℓ,iσ
2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ
R2be,1σ
2
)]+
, (46)
in bits per complex dimension. For each instantiation of the random Poisson processes Πℓ and
Πe, a realization of the RV Rs,i is obtained. The following theorem provides the distribution of
this RV.
Theorem 5.1: The MSR Rs,i between a typical node and its i-th closest neighbour, i ≥ 1, is
a RV whose cumulative distribution function (CDF) FRs,i(̺) is given by
FRs,i(̺) = 1−
ln 2(πλℓ)
i
(i− 1)!b
(
Pℓ
σ2
) i
b
×
∫ +∞
̺
2z
(2z − 1)1+ ib exp
−πλℓ
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z − 1
) 1
b
− πλe
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z−̺ − 1
) 1
b
 dz, (47)
for ̺ ≥ 0.
Proof: The MSR Rs,i in (46) can be expressed as Rs,i =
[
Rℓ,i −Re
]+
, where Rℓ,i =
log2
(
1 + Pℓ
R2bℓ,iσ
2
)
and Re = log2
(
1 + Pℓ
R2be,1σ
2
)
. The RV Rℓ,i is a transformation of the RV Xi ,
R2ℓ,i through the monotonic function g(x) = log2
(
1 + Pℓ
xbσ2
)
, and thus its PDF is given by the
rule fRe(̺) =
1
|g′(x)|
fXi(x)
∣∣∣
x=g−1(̺)
. Note that the sequence {Xi}∞i=1 represents Poisson arrivals on
the line with the constant arrival rate πλℓ, as can be easily shown using the mapping theorem [25,
Section 2.3]. Therefore, the RV Xi has an Erlang distribution of order i with rate πλℓ, and its
PDF is given by
fXi(x) =
(πλℓ)
ixi−1e−πλℓx
(i− 1)! , x ≥ 0.
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Then, applying the above rule, fRℓ,i(̺) can be shown to be
fRℓ,i(̺) = ln 2
(πλℓ)
i
(i− 1)!b
(
Pℓ
σ2
) i
b 2̺
(2̺ − 1)1+ ib exp
−πλℓ
(
Pℓ
σ2
2̺ − 1
) 1
b
 , ̺ ≥ 0. (48)
Replace λℓ with λe and setting i = 1, we obtain the PDF of Re as
fRe(̺) = ln 2
πλe
b
(
Pℓ
σ2
) 1
b 2̺
(2̺ − 1)1+ 1b exp
−πλe
(
Pℓ
σ2
2̺ − 1
) 1
b
 , ̺ ≥ 0. (49)
Since the sequences {Rℓ,i}∞i=1 and {Re,i}∞i=1 are mutually independent, so are the RVs Rℓ,i and
Re. This implies that CDF of Rs,i =
[
Rℓ,i −Re
]+
can be obtained through convolution of
fRℓ,i(̺) and fRe(̺) as
FRs,i(̺) = P
{[
Rℓ,i −Re
]+ ≤ ̺}
= 1− P{Rℓ,i −Re > ̺}
= 1−
∫ ∞
̺
fRℓ,i(z) ∗ fRe(−z) dz, (50)
for ̺ ≥ 0. Replacing (48) and (49) into (50), we obtain after some algebra
FRs,i(̺) = 1−
ln 2(πλℓ)
i
(i− 1)!b
(
Pℓ
σ2
) i
b
×
∫ +∞
̺
2z
(2z − 1)1+ ib exp
−πλℓ
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z − 1
) 1
b
− πλe
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z−̺ − 1
) 1
b
 dz,
for ̺ ≥ 0. This is the result in (47) and the proof is concluded.
B. Existence and Outage of the Maximum Secrecy Rate
Based on the results of Section V-A, we can now obtain the probability of existence of a
non-zero MSR, and the probability of secrecy outage. The following corollary provides such
probabilities.
Corollary 5.1: Considering the link between a typical node and its i-th closest neighbour,
i ≥ 1, the probability of existence of a non-zero MSR, pexist,i = P{Rs,i > 0}, is given by
pexist,i =
(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)i
. (51)
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and the probability of an outage in MSR, poutage,i(̺) = P{Rs,i < ̺} for ̺ > 0, is given by
poutage,i(̺) = 1− ln 2(πλℓ)
i
(i− 1)!b
(
Pℓ
σ2
) i
b
×
∫ +∞
̺
2z
(2z − 1)1+ ib exp
−πλℓ
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z − 1
) 1
b
− πλe
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z−̺ − 1
) 1
b
 dz (52)
Proof: To obtain (51), we note that the event {Rℓ,i > Re} is equivalent to {Nout ≥ i}.
Thus, we use (16) to write
pexist,i = P{Rℓ,i > Re}
=
∞∑
n=i
(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)n(
λe
λℓ + λe
)
=
(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)i
.
The expression for poutage(̺) follows directly from (47).
C. Numerical Results
Figure 13 shows the probability pexist,i of existence of a non-zero MSR from a typical node to
its i-th neighbour, as a function of the eavesdropper density λe. It can be seen that the existence
of a non-zero MSR Rs,i to any neighbour i becomes more likely as the value of λe increases.
Furthermore, since Rℓ,1 ≤ Rℓ,2 ≤ . . ., as the value of i increases, the i-th neighbour becomes
further away, and the corresponding pexist,i decreases.
Figure 14 shows the probability poutage,i of secrecy outage of a typical node transmitting to
its i-th neighbour, as a function of the desired secrecy rate ̺. As expected, a secrecy outage
become more likely as we increase the target secrecy rate ̺ set by the transmitter.
VI. THE CASE OF COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
We now aim to study the effect of colluding eavesdroppers on the secrecy of communications.
In order to focus on the effect of eavesdropper collusion on the MSR of the legitimate link, we
first consider in Sections VI-A to VI-D a single legitimate link with deterministic length rℓ in
the presence of a random process Πe. Such simplification eliminates the randomness associated
with the position of the legitimate nodes. We then consider both random processes Πℓ and
32
Πe in Section VI-E, and characterize the average node degree in the presence of eavesdropper
collusion.
A. Maximum Secrecy Rate of a Single Link
We consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 15, where a legitimate link is composed of two
nodes: one transmitter located at the origin (Alice), and one receiver located at a deterministic
distance rℓ from the origin (Bob). The eavesdroppers have ability to collude, i.e., they can
exchange and combine the information received by all the eavesdroppers to decode the secret
message. The eavesdroppers are scattered in the two-dimensional plane according to an arbitrary
spatial process Πe, and their distances to the origin are denoted by {Re,i}∞i=1, where Re,1 ≤ Re,2 ≤
. . ..
Since the colluding eavesdroppers may gather the received information and send it to a central
processor, the scenario depicted in Fig. 15 can be viewed as a SIMO Gaussian wiretap channel
depicted in Fig. 16. Here, the input is the signal transmitted by Alice, and the output of the
wiretap channel is the collection of signals received by all the eavesdroppers. We consider that
Alice sends a symbol x ∈ C with power constraint E{|x|2} ≤ Pℓ. The vectors hℓ ∈ Cm and
he ∈ Cn represent, respectively, the gains of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels.16 The
noise is represented by the vectors wℓ ∈ Cm and we ∈ Cn, which are considered to be mutually
independent Gaussian RVs with zero mean and non-singular covariance matrices Σℓ and Σe,
respectively. The system of Fig. 16 can then be summarized as
yℓ = hℓx+wℓ (53)
ye = hex+we. (54)
The scenario of interest can be obtained from the SIMO Gaussian wiretap channel in Fig. 16
by appropriate choice of the parameters hℓ, he, Σℓ, and Σe.
In this section, we determine the MSR of the legitimate link, in the presence of colluding
eavesdroppers scattered in the plane according to an arbitrary spatial process. The result is given
in the following theorem.
16We use boldface letters to denote vectors and matrices.
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Theorem 6.1: For a given realization of the arbitrary eavesdropper process Πe, the MSR of
the legitimate link is given by
Rs =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ · g(rℓ)
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ
∑∞
i=1 g(Re,i)
σ2e
)]+
, (55)
where Pℓ
∑∞
i=1 g(Re,i) , Prx,e is the aggregate power received by all the eavesdroppers.
Proof: For a given realization of the channels hℓ and he, it can be shown [51] that
y˜ℓ = h
†
ℓΣ
−1
ℓ yℓ and y˜e = h†eΣ−1e ye are sufficient statistics to estimate x from the corresponding
observations yℓ and ye.17 Since sufficient statistics preserve mutual information [52], for the
purpose of determining the MSR the vector channels in (53) and (54) can equivalently be written
in a (complex) scalar form corresponding to the Gaussian wiretap channel introduced in [39].
Then, the MSR Rs of the legitimate channel for a given realization of the channels hℓ and he
is given by
Rs =
[
log2
(
1 + h†ℓΣ
−1
ℓ hℓPℓ
1 + h†eΣ−1e hePℓ
)]+
. (56)
Setting hℓ =
√
g(rℓ), he =
[√
g(Re,1),
√
g(Re,2), · · ·
]T
, Σℓ = σ
2
ℓ I1, and Σe = σ2e I∞, where σ2ℓ
and σ2e are the noise powers of the legitimate and eavesdropper receivers, respectively, and In
is the n× n identity matrix, (56) reduces to (55). This concludes the proof.
B. Distribution of the Maximum Secrecy Rate of a Single Link
Theorem 6.1 is valid for a given realization of the spatial process Πe. In general, the MSR Rs
of the legitimate link in (55) is a RV, since it is a function the random eavesdropper distances
{Re,i}∞i=1. In what follows, we analyze the case where Πe is a homogeneous Poisson process on
the two-dimensional plane with density λe, and the channel gain is of the form g(r) = 1r2b with
b > 1. The following theorem characterizes the distribution of the MSR in this scenario.
Theorem 6.2: If Πe is a Poisson process with density λe and g(r) = 1r2b , b > 1, the MSR Rs
17We use † to denote the conjugate transpose operator.
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of the legitimate link is a RV whose CDF FRs(̺) is given by
FRs(̺) =

0, ̺ < 0,
1− FP˜rx,e
(1+ Pℓr2bℓ σ2ℓ )2−̺−1
(πλeC
−1
1/b
)b
Pℓ
σ2e
 , 0 ≤ ̺ < Rℓ,
1, ̺ ≥ Rℓ,
(57)
where Rℓ = log2
(
1 + Pℓ
r2bℓ σ
2
ℓ
)
is the capacity of the legitimate channel; Cα is defined as
Cα , 1− α
Γ(2− α) cos (πα
2
) (58)
with Γ(·) denoting the gamma function; and FP˜rx,e(·) is the CDF of a skewed stable RV P˜rx,e,
with parameters18
P˜rx,e ∼ S
(
α =
1
b
, β = 1, γ = 1
)
. (60)
Proof: For g(r) = 1
r2b
, the MSR Rs of the legitimate channel in (55) is a function of the
total power received by the eavesdroppers, Prx,e =
∑∞
i=1
Pℓ
R2be,i
. If Πe is a Poisson process, the
characteristic function of Prx,e can be written as [31]
Prx,e ∼ S
(
α =
1
b
, β = 1, γ = πλeC−11/bP 1/bℓ
)
, (61)
for b > 1. Defining the normalized stable RV P˜rx,e , Prx,eγ−b with γ = πλeC−11/bP 1/bℓ , we
have that P˜rx,e ∼ S
(
1
b
, 1, 1
)
from the scaling property [53]. In general, the CDF FP˜rx,e(·)
cannot be expressed in closed form except in the case where b = 2, which is analyzed in
Section VI-F. However, the characteristic function of P˜rx,e has the simple form of φP˜rx,e(w) =
exp
(−|w|1/b [1− j sign(w) tan ( π
2b
)])
, and thus FP˜rx,e(·) can always be expressed in the integral
form for numerical evaluation.
18We use S(α,β, γ) to denote the distribution of a real stable RV with characteristic exponent α ∈ (0, 2], skewness β ∈ [−1, 1],
and dispersion γ ∈ [0,∞). The corresponding characteristic function is [53]
φ(w) =


exp
(
−γ|w|α
[
1− jβ sign(w) tan
(
πα
2
)])
, α 6= 1,
exp
(
−γ|w|
[
1 + j 2
π
β sign(w) ln |w|
])
, α = 1.
(59)
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Using (55), we can now express FRs(̺) in terms of the CDF of P˜rx,e, for 0 ≤ ̺ < Rℓ, as
FRs(̺) = P{Rs ≤ ̺}
= P
{
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ
r2bℓ σ
2
ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx,e
σ2e
)
≤ ̺
}
= 1− P
{
Prx,e ≤ σ2e
[(
1 +
Pℓ
r2bℓ σ
2
ℓ
)
2−̺ − 1
]}
= 1− FP˜rx,e

(
1 + Pℓ
r2bℓ σ
2
ℓ
)
2−̺ − 1
(πλeC−11/b)b Pℓσ2e
 .
In addition, FRs(̺) = 0 for ̺ < 0 and FRs(̺) = 1 for ̺ ≥ Rℓ, since the RV Rs in (55) satisfies
0 ≤ Rs ≤ Rℓ, i.e., the MSR of the legitimate link in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers is
a positive quantity which cannot be greater than the MSR of the legitimate link in the absence
of eavesdroppers. This is the result in (64) and the proof is complete.
C. Existence and Outage of the Maximum Secrecy Rate of a Single Link
Based on the results of Section VI-B, we can now obtain the probability of existence of a
non-zero MSR, and the probability of secrecy outage for a single legitimate link in the presence
of colluding eavesdroppers. The following corollary provides such probabilities.
Corollary 6.1: If Πe is a Poisson process with density λe and g(r) = 1r2b , b > 1, the probability
of existence of a non-zero MSR in the legitimate link, pexist = P{Rs > 0}, is given by
pexist = FP˜rx,e
(
σ2e
(πλer
2
ℓC−11/b)bσ2ℓ
)
, (62)
and the probability of an outage in the MSR of the legitimate link, poutage(̺) = P{Rs < ̺} for
̺ > 0, is given by
poutage(̺) =

1− FP˜rx,e
(1+ Pℓr2bℓ σ2ℓ )2−̺−1
(πλeC
−1
1/b
)b
Pℓ
σ2e
 , 0 < ̺ < Rℓ,
1, ̺ ≥ Rℓ,
(63)
where Rℓ = log2
(
1 + Pℓ
r2bℓ σ
2
ℓ
)
is the capacity of the legitimate channel; and FP˜rx,e(·) is the CDF
of the normalized stable RV P˜rx,e, with parameters given in (60).
Proof: The expressions for pexist and poutage(̺) follow directly from (57).
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D. Colluding vs. Non-Colluding Eavesdroppers for a Single Link
We have so far considered the fundamental secrecy limits of a single legitimate link in the
presence of colluding eavesdroppers. According to Theorem 6.1, such scenario is equivalent to
having a single eavesdropper with an array that collects a total power P˜rx,e =
∑∞
i=1 Pℓ/R
2b
e,i. In
particular, when the eavesdroppers are positioned according to an homogeneous Poisson process,
Theorem 6.2 shows that the RV Prx,e has a skewed stable distribution.
We can obtain further insights by establishing a comparison with the case of a single legitimate
link in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. In such scenario, the MSR does not depend
on all eavesdroppers, but only on that with maximum received power (i.e., the closest one, when
only path loss is present). Thus, the total eavesdropper power is given by Prx,e = PℓR2be,1 . Using the
fact that R2e,1 is exponentially distributed with rate πλe, the PDF of Prx,e can be written as
fPrx,e(x) =
πλe
bx
(
Pℓ
x
)1/b
exp
(
−πλe
(
Pℓ
x
)1/b)
, x ≥ 0,
and the CDF of the corresponding MSR Rs can be easily determined from (55) as
FRs(̺) =

0, ̺ < 0,
1− exp
−πλe
 Pℓσ2e(
1+
Pℓ
r2b
ℓ
σ2
ℓ
)
2−̺−1
1/b
 , 0 ≤ ̺ < Rℓ,
1, ̺ ≥ Rℓ.
(64)
From this CDF, we can readily determine the probability of existence of a non-zero MSR, and
the probability of secrecy outage, similarly to the colluding case. Table IV summarizes the
differences between the colluding and non-colluding scenarios for a single legitimate link.
E. iS-Graph with Colluding Eavesdroppers
To study the effect of colluding eavesdroppers, we have so far made a simplification concerning
the legitimate nodes. Specifically, we considered only a single legitimate link with deterministic
length rℓ as depicted in Fig. 15, thus eliminating the randomness associated with the position
of the legitimate nodes. We now revisit the iS-graph model depicted in Fig. 2, where both
legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are distributed according to Poisson processes Πℓ and Πe. In
particular, the following theorem characterizes the effect of collusion in terms of the resulting
average node degree in such graph.
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Theorem 6.3: For the Poisson iS-graph with colluding eavesdroppers, secrecy rate thresh-
old ̺ = 0, equal noise powers σ2ℓ = σ2e , and channel gain function g(r) = 1r2b , b > 1, the average
degrees of a typical node are
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
sinc
(
1
b
)
, (65)
where sinc(x) , sin(πx)
πx
.
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ∪{0} obtained by adding a legitimate node to the origin
of the coordinate system, and denote the out-degree of the node at the origin by Nout. Using
(55), we can write
Nout = #
{
xi ∈ Πℓ : Rs,i > 0
}
= #
{
xi ∈ Πℓ : R2ℓ,i <
(
Pℓ
Prx,e
)1/b
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,ν2
}
.
The average out-degree can be determined as
E{Nout} = EΠℓ,Πe{Πℓ{B0(ν)}}
= EΠe{λℓπν2}
= λℓπEΠe
{(
Pℓ
Prx,e
)1/b}
. (66)
where the RV Prx,e has a stable distribution with parameters given in (61). As before, we define
the normalized stable RV P˜rx,e , Prx,eγ−b with γ = πλeC−11/bP 1/bℓ , such that P˜rx,e ∼ S
(
1
b
, 1, 1
)
.
Then, we can rewrite (66) as
E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
C1/bE{P˜−1/brx,e }. (67)
Using the Mellin transform of a stable RV, we show in Appendix C that (67) simplifies to
E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
sinc
(
1
b
)
. (68)
Noting that E{Nin} = E{Nout} for any directed random graph, we obtain the desired result in
(65).
It is insightful to rewrite (65) as E{Nout|colluding} = E{Nout|non-colluding} · η(b), where
η(b) = sinc
(
1
b
)
, and η(b) < 1 for b > 1. The function η(b) can be interpreted as the degradation
factor in average connectivity due to eavesdropper collusion. In the extreme where b = 1, we have
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complete loss of secure connectivity with η(1) = 0. This is because the series Prx,e =
∑∞
i=1
Pℓ
R2be,i
diverges (i.e., the total received eavesdropper power is infinite), so the resulting average node
degree is zero. In the other extreme where b→ ∞, we achieve the highest secure connectivity
with η(∞) = 1. This is because the first term Pℓ
R2be,1
in the Prx,e series (corresponding to the non-
colluding term) is dominant, so the average node degree in the colluding case approaches the
non-colluding one. In conclusion, cluttered environments with larger amplitude loss exponents b
are more favorable for secure communication, in the sense that in such environments collusion
only provides a marginal performance improvement for the eavesdroppers.
F. Numerical Results
We now illustrate the results obtained in the previous sections with a simple case study.
We consider the case where σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2, i.e., the legitimate link and the eavesdroppers
are subject to the same noise power, which is introduced by the electronics of the respective
receivers. Furthermore, we consider that the amplitude loss exponent is b = 2, in which case
the CDF of P˜rx,e for colluding eavesdroppers can be expressed using the Gaussian Q-function
as FP˜rx,e(x) = 2Q(1/
√
x), x ≥ 0. The CDF of Rs in (57) reduces to
FRs(̺) =

0, ̺ < 0,
1− 2Q
πλeC−11/2√ Pℓσ2(
1+
Pℓ
r4
ℓ
σ2
)
2−̺−1
 , 0 ≤ ̺ < Rℓ,
1, ̺ ≥ Rℓ.
(69)
In addition, (62) and (63) reduce, respectively, to
pexist = 2Q
(
πλer
2
ℓC−11/2
)
(70)
and
poutage(̺) =

1− 2Q
πλeC−11/2√ Pℓσ2(
1+
Pℓ
r4
ℓ
σ2
)
2−̺−1
 , 0 < ̺ < Rℓ,
1, ̺ ≥ Rℓ.
(71)
From these analytical results, we observe that of the following factors lead to a degradation of the
security of communications: increasing λe or rℓ, decreasing Pℓ/σ2, or allowing the eavesdroppers
to collude. In particular, as we let Pℓ/σ2 → ∞, poutage decreases monotonically, converging to
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the curve poutage = 1 − exp
(−πλer2ℓ2̺/2) in the non-colluding case, and to poutage = 1 −
2Q
(
πλer
2
ℓC−11/22̺/2
)
in the colluding case.
Figure 17 compares the PDFs of the (normalized) received eavesdropper power Prx,e
Pℓ
, for the
cases of colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. For b > 1, it is clear that
∑∞
i=1
1
R2be,i
> 1
R2be,1
a.s., i.e., the received eavesdropper power Prx,e is larger in the colluding case, resulting in a PDF
whose mass is more biased towards higher realizations of Prx,e.
Figure 18 plots the probability pexist of existence of a non-zero MSR, given in (70), as a
function of the eavesdropper density λe, for various values of the legitimate link length rℓ. As
predicted by analytically, the existence of a non-zero MSR becomes less likely by increasing λe
or rℓ.
19 A similar degradation in secrecy occurs by allowing the eavesdroppers to collude, since
more signal power from the legitimate user is available to the eavesdroppers, improving their
ability to decode the secret message.
Figure 19 quantifies the probability poutage of secrecy outage, given in (71), as a function of
the desired secrecy rate ̺, for various values of eavesdropper density. The vertical line marks
the capacity Rℓ of the legitimate link, which for the parameters indicated in Fig. 19 is Rℓ =
log2
(
1 + Pℓ
r2bℓ σ
2
ℓ
)
= 3.46 bits per complex dimension. As expected, if the target secrecy rate ̺
set by the transmitter exceeds Rℓ, a secrecy outage occurs with probability 1, since the MSR Rs
cannot be greater that the capacity Rℓ of the legitimate link. In comparison with the non-colluding
case, the ability of the eavesdroppers to collude leads to higher probabilities of secrecy outage.
This is because more signal power from the legitimate user is available to the eavesdroppers,
improving their ability to decode the secret message. A similar degradation in secrecy occurs
by increasing the eavesdropper density λe.
Figure 20 quantifies the (normalized) average node degree of the iS-graph, E{Nout}
λℓ/λe
, versus the
amplitude loss exponent b. The normalizing factor λℓ/λe corresponds to the average out-degree
in the non-colluding case. As predicted analytically, we observe that in the colluding case,
the normalized average out-degree η(b) = E{Nout}
λℓ/λe
is strictly increasing with b. Furthermore,
η(1) = 0 because the received eavesdropper power Prx,e is infinite, and η(∞) = 1 because the
first (non-colluding) term in the Prx,e series dominates the other terms. It is apparent from the
figure that cluttered environments with larger amplitude loss exponents b are more favorable for
19Note that pexist in (70) depends on λe and rℓ only through the product λer2ℓ .
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secure communication, in the sense that in such environments collusion only provides a marginal
performance improvement for the eavesdroppers.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Using the notion of strong secrecy, we provided an information-theoretic definition of the
iS-graph as a model for intrinsically secure communication in large-scale networks. Fundamental
tools from stochastic geometry allowed us to describe in detail how the spatial densities of
legitimate and eavesdropper nodes influence various properties of the Poisson iS-graph, such
as node degrees and isolation probabilities. In particular, we proved that the average in- and
out-degrees equal λℓ
λe
, and that out-isolation is more probable than in-isolation. In addition, we
considered the effect of the wireless propagation on the degree of the legitimate nodes. Surpris-
ingly, the average node degree is invariant with respect to the distribution of the propagation
effects (e.g., type of fading or shadowing), and is always equal to the ratio λℓ
λe
of spatial densities.
We then studied the effect of non-zero secrecy rate threshold ̺ and unequal noise powers σ2ℓ , σ2e
on the iS-graph. Specifically, we showed that E{Nout} is decreasing in ̺ and σ2ℓ , and is increasing
in σ2e . Furthermore, when the channel gain is of the form g(r) = 1r2b , we obtained expressions
for E{Nout} as a function of ̺, σ2ℓ , σ2e , and showed that it decays exponentially with ̺.
We explored the potential of sectorized transmission and eavesdropper neutralization as two
techniques for enhancing the secrecy of communications. If each legitimate node is able to
transmit independently in L sectors of the plane, our results prove that E{Nout} increases linearly
with L. On the other hand, if legitimate nodes are able to inspect their surrounding area to
guarantee that there are no eavesdroppers within a neutralization radius ρ, then E{Nout} increases
at least exponentially with ρ.
The PDF of the MSR Rs,i between a legitimate node and its i-th neighbor was characterized,
as well as the probability of existence of a non-zero MSR, and the probability of secrecy outage.
In particular, we quantified how these metrics depend on the densities λℓ, λe, the SNR Pℓσ2 , and
the amplitude loss exponent b.
Finally, we established the fundamental secrecy limits when the eavesdroppers are allowed
to collude, by showing that this scenario is equivalent to a SIMO Gaussian wiretap channel.
For an arbitrary spatial process Πe of the eavesdroppers, we derived the MSR of a legitimate
link. Then, for the case where Πe is a spatial Poisson process and the channel gain is of the
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form g(r) = 1
r2b
, we obtained the CDF of MSR of a legitimate link, and the average degree in
the iS-graph with colluding eavesdroppers. We concluded that as we increase the density λe of
eavesdroppers, or allow the eavesdroppers to collude, more power is available to the adversary,
improving their ability to decode the secret message, and hence decreasing the MSR of legitimate
links. Furthermore, we showed that cluttered environments with large amplitude loss exponent b
are move favorable for secure communications, in the sense that in such regime collusion only
provides a marginal performance improvement for the eavesdroppers.
Perhaps the most interesting insight to be gained from our results, is the exact quantification
of the impact of the eavesdropper density λe on the achievable secrecy rates — a modest density
of scattered eavesdroppers can potentially cause a drastic reduction in the MSR provided at
the physical layer of wireless communication networks. Our work has not yet addressed all of
the far reaching implications of the broadcast property of the wireless medium. In the most
general scenario, legitimate nodes could for example transmit their signals in a cooperative
fashion, whereas malicious nodes could use jamming to disrupt all communications. We hope
that further efforts in combining stochastic geometry with information-theoretic principles will
lead to a more comprehensive treatment of wireless security.
APPENDIX A
PROOF THAT INEQUALITY (23) IS STRICT
Define the event Fi , {Πe{Bx˘i(|x˘i|)} ≥ 1} and its complementary event Ei, which denote
full and empty, respectively. Using this notation, we can rewrite (22) as
pin−isol = P
{
∞∧
i=1
Fi
}
≤ P{F1 ∧ F2}.
To prove that pin−isol < P{F1} as in (23), it is sufficient to show that P{F1 ∧ F2} < P{F1}, or
equivalently, P{F1}−P{F1∧F2} = P{F1∧E2} > 0. Define the ball Bi , Bx˘i(|x˘i|). Then, with
reference to the auxiliary diagram in Fig. 5(c), we can write
P{F1 ∧ E2} = EΠℓ{P{F1 ∧ E2|Πℓ}}
= EΠℓ
{(
1− e−λeA{B1\B2}) · e−λeA{B2}} . (72)
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Since B1 * B2 a.s., then A{B1\B2} > 0 a.s., and the argument inside the expectation in (72) is
strictly positive, and thus P{F1 ∧ E2} > 0. This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF (45)
Because Πℓ is a Poisson process, the Palm probability Px{|x| < Re,1} in (44) can be computed
using Slivnyak’s theorem by adding a legitimate node at location x to Πℓ. For a fixed x ∈
D(ρ,∞), we can thus write
Px{|x| < Re,1} = PΘ,Πe{Πe{Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)\Bx(ρ)} = 0} (73)
≥ PΘ,Πe{Πe{Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)} = 0} (74)
= EΘ{exp(−λeA{Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)}} (75)
≥ exp(−λeEΘ{A{Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)}}), (76)
Equation (75) follows from conditioning on Θ, and using the fact that Πe and Θ are indepen-
dent. Equation (76) follows from Jensen’s inequality. The term inside the exponential in (76)
corresponds to the average area of a random shape, and can be computed using Fubini’s theorem
as
EΘ{A{Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)}} = EΘ
{∫ ∫
R2
1{y ∈ Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)}dy
}
=
∫ ∫
D(ρ,|x|)
P{y ∈ Θ}dy
=
∫ ∫
D(ρ,|x|)
P{Πℓ{By(ρ)} = 0}dy
=
∫ ∫
D(ρ,|x|)
e−λℓπρ
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
,pΘ
dy
= pΘπ(|x|2 − ρ2) (77)
Note that pΘ corresponds to the probability that a fixed point y is outside the total neutralization
region Θ, and does not depend on the coordinates of y due to the stationarity of the process Θ.
Replacing (77) into (76), we obtain the desired inequality in (45).
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APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF (68)
Let the Mellin transform of a RV X with PDF fX(x) be defined as20
MX(s) ,
∫ ∞
0
xsfX(x)dx. (78)
If X ∼ S (α, 1, 1) with 0 < α < 1, then [54, Eq. (17)]
MX(s) =
(
cos
(πα
2
))−s/α Γ (1− s
α
)
Γ(1− s) , (79)
for −1 < Re{s} < α. Then, since P˜rx,e ∼ S (α, 1, 1) with α = 1b ∈ (0, 1), we use (79) to write
E{P˜−αrx,e} =
∫ ∞
0
x−αfP˜rx,e(x)dx
=MP˜rx,e(−α)
=
cos
(
πα
2
)
Γ(1 + α)
. (80)
Using (58) and (80), we expand (67) as
E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
CαE{P˜−αrx,e}
=
λℓ
λe
· 1− α
Γ(2− α) cos (πα
2
) · cos (πα2 )
Γ(1 + α)
=
λℓ
λe
· 1− α
Γ(2− α)Γ(1 + α)
=
λℓ
λe
· sin(πα)
πα
,
where we used the following properties of the gamma function: Γ(z+1) = zΓ(z) and Γ(z)Γ(1−
z) = π
sin(πz)
. Defining sinc(x) , sin(πx)
πx
and noting that α = 1
b
, we obtain (68).
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0
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Symbol Usage
E{·} Expectation operator
P{·} Probability operator
∗ Convolution operator
† Conjugate transpose operator
fX (x) Probability density function of X
FX(x) Cumulative distribution function of X
H(X) Entropy of X
Πℓ = {xi},Πe = {ei} Poisson processes of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers
λℓ, λe Spatial densities of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers
Π{R} Number of nodes of process Π in region R
Nin, Nout In-degree and out-degree of a node
Bx(ρ) Ball centered at x with radius ρ
D(a, b) Annular region between radiuses a and b, centered at the origin
A{R} Area of region R
Zxi,xj Random propagation effect between xi and xj
Rℓ,i Distance between xi ∈ Πℓ and origin
Re,i Distance between ei ∈ Πe and origin
#S Number of elements in the set S
G(x, θ) Gamma distribution with mean xθ and variance xθ2
N (µ, σ2) Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
S(α, β, γ) Stable distribution with characteristic exponent α, skewness β, and dispersion γ
Table I
NOTATION AND SYMBOLS.
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Figure 1. Wireless wiretap channel.
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Legitimate node
Eavesdropper node
Figure 2. Example of an iS-graph on R2, considering that the secrecy rate threshold is zero, the wireless environment introduces
only path loss, and the noise powers of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes are equal. In such scenario, a transmitter xi is
connected to a receiver xj if and only if xj is closer to xi than any other eavesdropper, as described in (9).
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Figure 3. Out-degree of a node. In this example, the node at the origin can transmit messages with information-theoretic
security to Nout = 3 nodes.
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Figure 4. In-degree of a node. In this example, the node at the origin can receive messages with information-theoretic security
from Nin = 2 nodes. The RV A is the area of a typical Voronoi cell, induced by the eavesdropper Poisson process Πe with
density λe.
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Figure 5. Auxiliary diagrams.
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n\k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1
2 1 1
3 1 3 1
4 1 7 6 1
5 1 15 25 10 1
6 1 31 90 65 15 1
7 1 63 301 350 140 21 1
Table II
STIRLING NUMBERS OF THE SECOND KIND.
k 1 2 3 4
E{A˜k} 1 1.280 1.993 3.650
Table III
FIRST FOUR MOMENTS OF THE RANDOM AREA A˜ OF A TYPICAL VORONOI CELL, INDUCED BY A UNIT-DENSITY POISSON
PROCESS [49].
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Figure 6. PMF of the in- and out-degree of a node ( λe
λℓ
= 0.4). The vertical line marks the average node degrees, E{Nout} =
E{Nin} =
λℓ
λe
= 2.5, in accordance with Property 3.2.
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Figure 7. Probabilities of in- and out-isolation of a node, versus the ratio λe
λℓ
. Note that pin−isol < pout−isol for any fixed λeλℓ ,
as proved in Property 3.3.
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y = ψ(r)
Figure 8. The effect of non-zero secrecy rate threshold ̺ and unequal noise powers σ2ℓ , σ2e on the average node degree, for
the case of g(r) = 1
r2b
. The function ψ(r) was defined in (36).
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Figure 9. Average node degree versus the secrecy rate threshold ̺, for various values of Pℓ/σ2 (σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2, g(r) = 1r2b ,
b = 2, λℓ = 1m
−2
, λe = 0.1m
−2).
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Figure 10. Out-degree of a node with sectorized transmission. In this example with L = 4 sectors, the node at the origin can
transmit messages with information-theoretic security to Nout = 5 nodes.
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Figure 11. Out-degree of a node with eavesdropper neutralization. In this example, the node at the origin can transmit messages
with information-theoretic security to Nout = 5 nodes.
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Figure 12. Average node degree versus the neutralization radius ρ, for various values of λe (λℓ = 1m−2).
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Figure 13. Probability pexist,i of existence of a non-zero MSR versus the eavesdropper density λe, for various values of the
neighbour index i (λℓ = 1m−2, b = 2, Pℓ/σ2 = 10, ̺ = 1 bit).
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Figure 14. Probability poutage,i of secrecy outage between a node and its i-th closest neighbour, for various values of the
neighbour index i (λℓ = 1m−2, λe = 0.1m−2, b = 2, Pℓ/σ2 = 10).
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Figure 15. Communication in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers.
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Figure 16. SIMO Gaussian wiretap channel, which can be used to analyze the scenario of colluding eavesdroppers depicted
in Fig. 15.
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Non-colluding Colluding
Prx,e =
Pl
R2be,1
Prx,e =
∑∞
i=1
Pℓ
R2b
e,i
fPrx,e(x) =
πλe
bx
(
Pℓ
x
)1/b
exp
(
−πλe
(
Pℓ
x
)1/b)
, x ≥ 0 Prx,e ∼ S
(
α = 1
b
, β = 1, γ = πλeC
−1
1/bP
1/b
ℓ
)
FRs (c) = 1− exp

−πλe

 Pℓσ2e(
1+
Pℓ
r2b
ℓ
σ2
ℓ
)
2−̺−1


1/b , 0 ≤ ̺ < Rℓ FRs(c) = 1− FP˜rx,e


(
1+
Pℓ
r2b
ℓ
σ2
ℓ
)
2−̺−1
(πλeC
−1
1/b
)b
Pℓ
σ2e

 , 0 ≤ ̺ < Rℓ
with P˜rx,e ∼ S
(
α = 1
b
, β = 1, γ = 1
)
pexist = exp
(
−πλer
2
ℓ
(
σ2ℓ
σ2e
)1/b)
pexist = FP˜rx,e
(
σ2e
(πλer
2
ℓ
C−1
1/b
)bσ2
ℓ
)
E{Nout} =
λℓ
λe
E{Nout} =
λℓ
λe
sinc
(
1
b
)
Table IV
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CASES OF NON-COLLUDING AND COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS, CONSIDERING A SINGLE
LEGITIMATE LINK, AND A CHANNEL GAIN OF THE FORM g(r) = 1
r2b
.
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Figure 17. PDF fPrx,e/Pℓ(x) of the (normalized) received eavesdropper power Prx,e/Pℓ, for the cases of colluding and non-
colluding eavesdroppers (b = 2, λe = 0.5m−2).
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Figure 18. Probability pexist of existence of a non-zero MSR versus the eavesdropper density λe, for the cases of colluding
and non-colluding eavesdroppers, and various values of rℓ (b = 2).
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Figure 19. Probability poutage of secrecy outage for the cases of colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers, and various
densities λe of eavesdroppers (b = 2, Pℓ/σ2 = 10, rℓ = 1m). The vertical line marks the capacity of the legitimate link, which
for these system parameters is Rℓ = 3.46 bits/complex dimension.
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Figure 20. Normalized average node degree of the iS-graph, E{Nout}
λℓ/λe
, versus the amplitude loss exponent b, for the cases of
colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers.
